Since Russia began deploying these weapons in large numbers in autumn 2022, the Shahed-136—which Moscow has rebranded as the "Geranium-2"—has become the most prolific precision strike weapon of the war. According to data compiled by Ukraine Drone Watch from official Ukrainian Air Force communications and open-source intelligence, Russian forces have launched more than 8,000 of these drones against Ukrainian targets as of January 2026. The tempo has only increased: in December 2025 alone, Ukraine documented over 900 Shahed launches, the highest monthly total since the weapon's introduction to the conflict.
What makes the Shahed-136 so significant is not its sophistication—by modern standards, it is a relatively simple weapon—but rather what it represents: the democratization of precision strike capability. At an estimated production cost of $20,000 to $50,000 per unit, the Shahed offers a way to deliver explosive payloads with GPS-guided accuracy at a fraction of the cost of traditional cruise missiles. A single Kalibr cruise missile, by comparison, costs Russia an estimated $1.5 million.
This cost disparity has created what defense analysts describe as an "attrition equation" that fundamentally favors the attacker. When Ukraine intercepts a Shahed using a surface-to-air missile—whether a Soviet-era S-300 round or a modern American AIM-120 AMRAAM fired from a NASAMS launcher—the defender expends a weapon that costs anywhere from $100,000 to over $1 million. Russia can afford to lose dozens of Shaheds for every successful strike; Ukraine cannot afford the missiles to stop them all.
The tactical employment of these weapons has evolved considerably since their first appearance over Ukrainian skies. Early Russian attacks tended to launch relatively small numbers of drones—perhaps 10 to 20—in what appeared to be probing operations to test Ukrainian defenses. By late 2024, the pattern had shifted dramatically. Russian forces began launching coordinated swarms of 50, 100, or even more drones in single attacks, often timed to coincide with cruise missile strikes.
The logic behind this combined approach is brutally straightforward. The Shahed drones, which fly at relatively low altitudes and speeds of around 150 to 185 kilometers per hour, force Ukrainian air defenses to activate their radars and expend their interceptor missiles. Once defensive systems are engaged and potentially depleted, faster cruise missiles follow, facing degraded opposition. Ukrainian air defense commanders have described this as a "grinding" strategy designed to exhaust their finite stockpiles of Western-supplied munitions.
The targets of these attacks reveal a deliberate strategy aimed at Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. Analysis of strike data shows that electrical substations, transformer facilities, and power generation plants account for the majority of confirmed Shahed targets. Attacks intensify predictably ahead of winter months, when damage to heating infrastructure carries the greatest humanitarian impact. Water treatment facilities, pumping stations, and telecommunications infrastructure round out the target list.
Ukrainian defenses have achieved remarkable success against the Shahed threat, with the Air Force regularly reporting interception rates of 80 to 90 percent during major attacks. This performance reflects hard-won adaptation: the deployment of mobile anti-aircraft gun systems like the German Gepard, which can engage drones with 35mm cannon fire at far lower cost than missiles; the integration of civilian early warning networks that extend detection ranges through distributed acoustic sensors and smartphone reporting apps; and the innovative use of fighter aircraft for nighttime interception missions.
Yet these defensive successes come at a cost that extends beyond missile expenditure. Each night of air alerts disrupts sleep for millions of Ukrainians. Each successful strike on infrastructure requires repair crews to work under dangerous conditions. The psychological toll of constant aerial harassment—what some analysts have termed "drone terror"—is difficult to quantify but undeniably real.
The strategic implications of the Shahed-136's success extend far beyond Ukraine. Defense ministries across NATO have begun urgent reassessments of their own air defense requirements, recognizing that the threat of cheap, mass-produced attack drones is not limited to this conflict. Iran has demonstrated a willingness to export these weapons, and the technology required to produce similar systems is within reach of numerous state and non-state actors.
Perhaps most significantly, the Shahed has validated a theory of warfare that prioritizes quantity over quality, industrial capacity over technological sophistication. Russia's ability to sustain attacks despite Western sanctions reflects both Iranian production support and Moscow's own efforts to establish domestic manufacturing. Intelligence estimates suggest Russia now receives 300 to 400 Shahed-series drones monthly from Iran while simultaneously ramping up licensed production at facilities within Russia.
The Shahed-136 is not a wonder weapon. It is slow, it is noisy, and it can be shot down by a determined defense. But it has proven that in the age of precision warfare, the most consequential weapons may not be the most advanced—they may simply be the ones you can build by the thousands.