The Orlan-10 is perhaps the most ubiquitous reconnaissance drone of the conflict, with hundreds believed to be in Russian service. Produced by the Special Technology Center in St. Petersburg, it is a thoroughly conventional design: a pusher-propeller aircraft with a wingspan of about 3.1 meters, capable of carrying various payloads including electro-optical cameras, thermal imagers, and electronic warfare equipment. Its endurance of up to 16 hours and operational ceiling of 5,000 meters allow extended surveillance of target areas.
What makes the Orlan-10 significant is not its capabilities, which are modest by modern standards, but its integration into Russian targeting processes. An Orlan loitering over a Ukrainian position can provide real-time video to artillery commanders, enabling adjustment of fire against moving targets or confirmation of strikes against fixed ones. The same drone can map defensive positions, identify air defense locations, and track logistics movements—intelligence that feeds into planning for subsequent strikes.
The ZALA 421-16, produced by the same Kalashnikov Concern subsidiary that manufactures the Lancet loitering munition, serves similar reconnaissance functions with somewhat different characteristics. Lighter and more portable than the Orlan-10, the ZALA trades endurance for deployability, making it better suited for tactical units that need organic reconnaissance capability. Its common lineage with the Lancet means that targeting data gathered by a ZALA can be seamlessly passed to Lancet operators for immediate engagement.
The Supercam S350, developed by a Russian company that has since been sanctioned, represents a somewhat larger class of tactical reconnaissance drone. With a wingspan of 3.4 meters and endurance exceeding 4 hours, it has been employed for both reconnaissance and artillery spotting roles. Like the Orlan-10, it has appeared in sufficient numbers to suggest substantial pre-war stockpiling and ongoing production.
Ukrainian forces have documented the operational patterns of these reconnaissance systems in considerable detail. Prior to major strikes on infrastructure targets, Orlan-10 activity typically increases in the target area, with drones conducting what appear to be mapping flights and updated reconnaissance. This pattern has enabled Ukrainian air defense units to anticipate attacks based on changes in reconnaissance activity—a form of warning that supplements other intelligence sources.
Countering these reconnaissance drones has proven challenging despite their relatively modest performance. Their operational altitudes, typically between 1,500 and 5,000 meters, place them above the effective range of most man-portable air defense systems but below the engagement floor of some medium-range systems. Their small size and relatively low radar cross-section make detection difficult. And their numbers—Russia appears to have launched thousands over the course of the conflict—mean that destroying individual drones rarely creates lasting gaps in coverage.
Electronic warfare has emerged as one of the more effective countermeasures. The reconnaissance drones rely on radio links for control and video transmission; disrupting these links can force the drone to either return to base on autopilot or, in some cases, crash. Ukrainian forces have captured multiple Orlan-10s intact after their control links were successfully jammed. GPS spoofing has also proven effective, with documented cases of drones landing in Ukrainian-controlled territory after their navigation systems were deceived.
The cat-and-mouse dynamic between reconnaissance drones and countermeasures continues to evolve. Russian manufacturers have responded to jamming successes by hardening drone systems against electronic attack, incorporating frequency-hopping radios and more resilient GPS receivers. Ukrainian electronic warfare operators, in turn, have developed more sophisticated techniques to overcome these improvements. The cycle of adaptation shows no signs of concluding.
Beyond their direct reconnaissance role, these drones serve as force multipliers for Russian artillery. The ability to observe targets in real time, adjust fire based on observed impacts, and confirm destruction has dramatically increased the effectiveness of Russian fires compared to earlier conflicts where such capabilities were limited. Ukrainian artillerists operate under constant threat of observation and the rapid counter-battery fire that follows detection.
Ukrainian forces have developed their own reconnaissance drone capabilities, initially relying heavily on commercial systems before developing and deploying purpose-built military platforms. The Leleka-100 and the PD-1, both Ukrainian designs, have provided reconnaissance support for Ukrainian operations while Western-supplied systems have supplemented domestic production. The asymmetry in numbers, however, has generally favored Russian forces, who have been able to maintain more persistent surveillance coverage across the front.
The reconnaissance drone war is, in many ways, the hidden substrate upon which the more visible conflicts play out. Every successful artillery strike, every precisely targeted cruise missile, every Lancet that finds its mark—almost all trace back to intelligence gathered by the humble aircraft circling patiently overhead. In the attention economy of war reporting, these systems will never compete with the dramatic footage of strike drones. But those who understand the kill chain know where it begins.