The commander of the Unmanned Systems Battalion of the 12th Special Forces Brigade Azov, who operates under the call sign "Yas," has been at the forefront of this technological shift. In a recent interview with defense journalists, he provided unprecedented detail on both the promise and the limitations of fiber-optic FPV drones as they are actually employed in combat.
"The idea is great," Yas explained, "because you are operating in total radio silence, so you cannot be detected by any radar system. And any electronic warfare means—they are just inefficient." This single advantage addresses what has become the defining challenge of drone warfare in Ukraine: the saturation of the electromagnetic spectrum with jamming signals that can disable or misdirect radio-controlled drones before they reach their targets.
The technology works by replacing the radio link between drone and operator with a physical fiber-optic cable that unspools from the drone as it flies. Video feeds from the drone's camera travel back through the cable, while control inputs travel forward—all at the speed of light and entirely immune to electromagnetic interference. For an operator accustomed to losing control of drones as they approach enemy positions protected by electronic warfare systems, the difference is transformative.
But Yas was equally candid about the technology's limitations. The success rate, he estimated, is approximately 50 percent—meaning half of all fiber-optic drones launched on combat missions successfully strike their targets. This figure, while perhaps disappointing compared to the technology's theoretical potential, reflects the practical challenges of deploying fragile systems in combat conditions.
"This technology is quite fragile," Yas noted. "Any mistake in handling this drone can result in an unintended explosion, for example, or in a loss of control." The fiber-optic cable itself can tear if the drone maneuvers too aggressively or encounters obstacles. Poorly trained pilots, rushing to engage targets under combat stress, make errors that waste expensive systems. And not all manufacturers have proven capable of producing reliable equipment.
This last point emerged as a recurring theme in the commander's account. In the early days of fiber-optic drone adoption, many Ukrainian manufacturers were essentially reselling Chinese components without fully understanding how to integrate them for military use. "They basically purchased the fiber optic systems from China, and they were just reselling the Chinese components," Yas said. "We were buying the technology without properly understanding how to deploy it."
The quality problem has improved over time as manufacturers responded to feedback from frontline units, but it has created a new challenge: demand far exceeds supply. The manufacturers capable of producing reliable fiber-optic systems have long waiting lists, sometimes stretching two to three months. For a unit in active combat, waiting that long for critical equipment is not always possible.
Perhaps surprisingly, fiber-optic drones constitute less than 5 percent of Yas's unit's drone inventory. The explanation is not lack of interest but simple availability. "The popularity of this technology is the key reason why we cannot ensure we have a sufficient number of drones using this technology," he explained. Good manufacturers have more customers than they can serve, while purchasing from less reliable sources risks wasting money on systems that will not perform.
The cost of fiber-optic FPV drones has decreased as production has scaled, with systems capable of 10-kilometer range now available for approximately $1,200. This remains more expensive than standard radio-controlled FPVs, but the price differential is narrowing. The more significant constraint is the fiber-optic cable itself, which limits range in ways that radio systems do not face. Ukrainian units have successfully employed drones with ranges up to 15 kilometers, with some 20-kilometer operations documented. Russian forces, according to Yas, have already deployed systems with 30-kilometer range—a capability gap that Ukrainian manufacturers are working to close.
The arms race between fiber-optic drones and potential countermeasures is already underway. Video has emerged of Russian FPV drones deliberately cutting the fiber-optic cables of Ukrainian drones using their rotor blades—a novel form of air-to-air combat at the smallest possible scale. Physical barriers and netting systems designed to snag the trailing cables represent another potential countermeasure, though their practical effectiveness remains unproven.
What makes the fiber-optic drone story significant is not the technology itself, which is relatively straightforward, but what it reveals about the nature of innovation in this conflict. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces began the war with fiber-optic drone capabilities. The technology emerged in response to a specific tactical problem—electronic warfare saturation—and spread through decentralized experimentation rather than top-down procurement programs. Frontline units identified a need, manufacturers responded with products of varying quality, operators provided feedback, and the technology improved.
This cycle of adaptation continues. The state-level production and procurement systems that would normally scale successful innovations have been slow to incorporate fiber-optic drones, leaving units dependent on volunteer donations and direct manufacturer relationships. "The state, at the moment, doesn't ensure a steady supply of such systems," Yas acknowledged. It is a familiar pattern in this conflict: tactical innovation outpacing institutional capacity, with individual units improvising solutions while bureaucracies struggle to keep pace.
The fields of eastern Ukraine, strewn with fiber-optic cables, offer a glimpse of a possible future of warfare—one in which the electromagnetic spectrum is so contested that physical connections become the only reliable means of control. Whether that future arrives may depend less on technology than on the ability of military institutions to learn from what frontline operators have already discovered.